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T his paper examines the following aspects of offshore safety in oil and gas productionsystems before and after the Piper Alpha Disaster:
· Regulation/legislation;
· Research/risk modelling;
· General safety trends.
It shows that the change from prescriptive regulation to self-regulation has produced better
designs and that the research and risk modelling before and after Piper Alpha cover the
same  elds but are now more focused. There is clear evidence of a desire to minimize human
exposure to risk through automatic systems and devise the safest design option as early as
possible, for more detailed development.
The evidence points to steady reduction of fatalities and injury rates over at least 15 years,
but the highest individual risk is still transport to and from the installation.
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INTRODUCTION
The trends in safety in nearly, if not all industries, have
two features. The  rst is steady improvement under the
in uence of the company/industry because it is seen to be
morally and  nancially correct. The second is the step
change following some major disaster, under the in uence
of regulatory bodies, public and corporate pressures. The
offshore oil and gas industry in the UK shows both of
these features. The major event in the UK was the Piper
Alpha Disaster on 6 July 1988. Just as anyone can
remember where they were when they heard of the death
of President Kennedy, anyone working in the offshore oil
and gas industry can remember where they were when
they heard of the Piper Alpha Disaster. Similarly, anyone
working in the chemical industry can remember where
they were when they heard of the Flixborough Nypo
Plant Explosion. The two eras– before Piper Alpha and
after Piper Alpha– will be described separately.
BACKGROUND TO THE INDUSTRY
Before embarking on a discussion of the historic
development of safety management in the oil and gas
industry, it is necessary to carry out a brief analysis of the
chemistry and the process.
In the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) there are broadly
three types of hydrocarbon  uids as shown in Table 1 (the
values are indicative). The  uids generally exist as a single
phase– gas and condensate as a dense gas phase and oil as
a liquid– in traps of semi-porous rocks, sealed by faults
and folds with an imperious cap rock and often in contact
with an aquifer at the bottom of the reservoir. Gas originates
from woody material which eventually became coal, and
is found in old sand dunes off the East Anglian Coast. Oil
and condensate originate from marine deposits and can
be found from a line east of Dundee, north round the
Shetlands to west of the Hebrides (other deposits are to be
found in Liverpool Bay and the South of England). The
 uids are paraf nic, gas has the lowest mean molecular
weight and oil the highest, all contain methane (gas being
essentially methane) but the heaviest molecules approxi-
mate to tars. The chemistry is long  nished. The reservoir
pressures vary from location to location and with the
 uid type but lie in the range of 25MPa to 100MPa and
have a temperature range of 100°C to 200°C. As would be
expected, when the pressure of the oil is reduced, gases
start to leave solution below the bubble point which is of
the order of 5MPa. In the case of gas and condensate, two
phases are formed when the dense phase is expanded to
about 5MPa. (These values must be treated as indicative
as they are very much speci c to the  uid and the reservoir
conditions.)
Process pressures can range from 150 kPa to 40MPa. The
gas platform separates the two phases produced by the
pressure drop between the reservoir and the separator,
meters the two  ows and recombines the two  ows for
two-phase transport in a sub-sea pipeline to a shore terminal.
Oil and condensate involve essentially two to four  ash
stages (two to four theoretical plates in a distillation
system). The gas is transported to a shore terminal by a
sub-sea pipeline and the oil (liquid phase) is transported
to shore either by tankers with a vapour pressure of 50 kPa
or by a sub-sea pipeline at a vapour pressure of about
1MPa. This rather simplistic analysis ignores the mass
throughputs which are large by any measure. Gas  elds
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can produce 5000 to 10,000 tonnes per day at pressures of
10 MPa and oil  elds can produce at rates of 10,000 to
20,000 tonnes per day of oil and 1000 to 5000 tonnes per
day of associated gas. Piping sizes are large and sub-sea
piping can be up to 1 metre in diameter.
In summary, throughputs are high and the process is
very simple, the properties are well known or predictable
and well understood. However, this ignores the complexity
of the gas platform as a whole which consists of:
· A hydrocarbon process plant;
· A power plant;
· A hotel;
· A heliport;
· A ‘harbour’ for service vessels.
Against this there are about 300 offshore installations
in UK, 4000 in the Gulf of Mexico and 6000 globally1. In
effect there is a great mass of data on both performance
and safety.
BEFORE PIPER ALPHA
Background
The advent of oil and gas in the UKCS was of economic
importance to Britain. Unlike the chemical industry which
started small and grew, the offshore industry has tended
to go from initial large developments (Brent, Forties, etc)
which were easy to  nd, to smaller more marginal
developments (sub-sea). The  rst oil  elds had capacities
of over 75,000 tonnes per day compared to new ones with
capacities of less than 10,000 tonnes per day. The  rst
commercial gas was found by BP in March 1967 (West
Sole) and the  rst commercial oil in November 1970
(Forties)2. The  rst designs were modelled on those in the
Gulf of Mexico where there were, at that time, about 1000
installations1. The American Petroleum Institute had
already developed many standards and recommended
practices which were readily transferred to the UKCS–
many are still in use.
The structure of the legislation and regulation of the
offshore oil and gas industry prior to 1990 is discussed
extensively by Lord Cullen in the Public Enquiry into the
Piper Alpha Disaster3. There were many parties with an
interest in some part of the offshore development:
· Department of Energy– interested in developing a
nature asset;
· Civil Aviation Authorities– interested in transport to the
installations;
· Marine Authorities– interested in location of the
installations;
· Department of Trade (Marine Division).
The Department of Energy (Petroleum Engineering
Division) administered the Health and Safety at Work, etc
Act 1974 on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive. In
the late 1970s there was perceived to be a con ict of
interests where the Department of Energy was both acting
for the Regulator and developing the nation’s resources.
This was analysed and a report in 19804 supported the
existing structure.
Legislation
The  rst major accident in the UKCS occurred with
the collapse of the drilling rig Sea Gem5 on 11 December
1965 due to brittle fracture of the structure. This resulted
in the passing of the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installa-
tions) Act in 1971 which became the enabling act for
further regulations but which also required one designated
Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) responsible for
health, safety or welfare and discipline/order on the
installation. Many of the regulations which followed were
prescriptive and contained prescriptive guidance notes.
This approach to safety resulted in a rigid application of
the regulations, and the implications are discussed in Lord
Cullen’s Report3. Many of these regulations have now been
repealed.
Data Access/Modelling
The industry, generally, is based on a number of similar
installations and there has tended to be a number of Joint
Industry Projects (JIP) where costs and knowledge are
shared by many companies. Some had started to collect
their own accident data but one database– Worldwide
Offshore Accident Database (WOAD)1– was funded
by one company and its development is now funded by
subscription.
The main areas of interest prior to the Piper Alpha
Disaster were (and still are):
· Fires;
· Explosions;
· The performance of sub-sea pipelines and risers
(the vertical section of line between the sea bed and the
platform);
· Leak parameters;
· Evacuation.
The cost of oil is dictated by a world balance of supply
and demand. There is no immediate competition for sales
of oil and gas. Oil companies do not necessarily have to
compete on technical grounds, although technology can
improve pro t margins.
The data and techniques for predicting and assessing
the effects of the Piper Alpha Disaster were available prior
to the event itself. The potential for semi-con ned gas
explosions in offshore installations was recognized by
many companies, and two explosion models had been
developed– one by the Christian Michelson Institute
(Norway)6 and another by British Gas7– other companies
had their own in-house modules8. The failure rate of sub-sea
pipelines and risers was researched by the Battelle Institute9
while British Gas carried out research into the crack
propagation of pipelines underground and sub sea10.
These data have not been seen in the public forum. Various
companies and consultancieshad started to collect their own
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Table 1. Types of hydrocarbon  uid in the UK Continental
Shelf.
Type % wt/wt gas % wt/wt liquid
Gas 95 5
Condensate 65 35
Oil 10 90
in-house leak rate data but they did show variations11,
no doubt due to local cultural features (see later). A two-
phase out ow model12 was developed for pipelines; mass
 uxes were assessed after a few minutes to be in the order
of:
Gas pipelines 150 kg s–1m–2
Oil pipelines (live oil) 2000kg s–1m–2
The only feature not fully recognized prior to Piper Alpha
was the carbon monoxide production rate in ventilation-
controlled  res. An analysis of the escape from installa-
tions by Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival
Craft (TEMPSC) was carried out by Technica (now DNV
Technica)13. The results indicated weaknesses in the
launch features of TEMPSC which were systematically
recti ed. However, various other means of escape were
under active study, notably ‘Free Fall’ craft used in the
Norwegian section of the North Sea (where the craft falls
off a slider and enters the sea at an angle with a horizontal
component of velocity which propels the craft away from
the installation so avoiding collision with the legs of the
platform.
General Trends in Safety to 1990
The Brown Book2 contained accident data for all offshore
installations but the data were restricted to accidents within
the 500m safety zone. This excluded a number of helicopter
accidents outside the safety zone. The major transport
accident was the loss of a twin rotor Boeing 234 (Chinook)
off Sumburgh, Shetland Island with the loss of 42 persons
which distorts the results, but the range of the fatalities for
transport alone is 2 to 4 persons per year. Four other areas
show signi cant improvements over the periods 1974–1979
and 1981–1990:
· Drilling shows a reduction in fatality rates of 1/63 wells
to 1/152 wells due to better procedures and more use of
mechanical handling.
· Diving shows a reduction in fatality rates of 1/16
installations per year to 1/344 installations per year due
to the use of Remote Operated Vehicles (inherently safer)
and attention to the recovery of the diving bell and the
protection of the diver against hypothermia.
· Crane operations show a reduction in fatality rates of
1/25 installations per year to 1/147 installations per year
due to attention to procedures and the weather.
· Boat operations show a reduction in fatality rates from
1/31 installations per year to 1/74 due to attention to
procedures and the weather.
Finally, the  rst totally unoccupied installation, in
Amethyst Gas Field, was commissioned in September
1990. This was an extension of the inherently safer
approach.
Summary
The industry was highly reactive to accidents and did
make signi cant improvements in safety standards. Against
this, the approach was deterministic, with the inherent
assumption that risks could be assessed and eliminated by
a hardware solution without the recognition that a good
safety culture and good safety management systems are
equally important.
AFTER PIPER ALPHA
The shock which followed the Piper Alpha Disaster
should not be underestimated. Nearly everyone working
in the industry knew someone who was affected directly or
indirectly and so many who worked offshore could identify
with the disaster. Many companies initiated some form
of audit of the installation, drawing on the steady  ow of
uncon rmed information from survivors (some of which
was proven accurate by Lord Cullen’s enquiry3). One
company audit was set up within one week of the accident
and reported formally on over 12 installations within
another seven weeks, with over 400 ranked recommen-
dations for action14. The Department of Energy issued
its own internal report on the disaster in September 198915
and Lord Cullen produced his report on the Public Enquiry
into the Piper Alpha Disaster in October 19903. In this
there were 106 direct recommendations under 24 head-
ings. The main elements centred on Safety Cases, Safety
Management Systems, Independent Assessment and
Survey, Legislation Changes and the Regulatory Body.
The regulation of offshore safety was transferred from the
Petroleum Engineering Division of the Department of
Energy to the Health and Safety Executive within weeks
of the issue of the report.
Legislation
The changes in regulations started before the issue of
Lord Cullen’s report. The  rst called for the installation
of a suitably protected remote isolation at the top of the
riser leading to the pipeline from the installation16.
This has since been integrated into new regulations and
has been repealed. (While such a valve existed on Piper
Alpha, it was not located in the ideal location. If it had
been located as indicated16, the subsequent history of the
industry might have been different.) As might be expected,
the shift from prescriptive regulation to self-regulation
meant much of the legislation had to be written. The start
was the Offshore Safety Act 1992 which amongst others
extended the application of Part I of the Health and Safety
at Work, etc Act 1974. It would be dif cult to summarize
all the regulations which followed but four are singled out
for attention. The  rst, the Offshore Installations (Safety
Case) Regulations17 was interesting in that there was a
prescriptive criterion for the impairment frequency of the
Temporary Refuge (TR) and the requirement to assess that
frequency using Quanti ed Risk Assessment techniques.
There was also a requirement to assess the overall risk to
those on board and to give a criterion; this was fairly
generally taken by the industry as a whole as those in
Reference 18. The second, PFEER19, called for demon-
stration of performance criteria– that is, if any assessment
used any performance criteria in the Emergency Response
assessments, they have to be stated and justi ed. In both
References 17 and 19 the requirements went further than
anything now required in the proposed Control of Major
Accident Hazards Regulations.DCR20 called for the correct
and appropriate design, operation, maintenance and ulti-
mate abandonment of the installation. On the face of it,
145SAFETY MANAGEMENT FOR OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
Trans IChemE, Vol 77, Part B, May 1999
this is as it should be, but DCR includes wells and carries
82 additional requirements. In addition, it modi es the
Safety Case Regulations17 and has a section on ‘veri cation
schemes for safety-critical elements’ including records and
independent comment. MAR21 goes deeper and addresses
safety management systems including weather data. In
some respects, these have more impact than onshore
regulations.
Data Access/Modelling
The main safety issues were perceived to be the same as
before Piper Alpha:
· Loss of containment/ignition probability;
· Fire assault of steel leading to vessel failure or structural
collapse;
· Explosion modelling and equipment response.
The loss of containment can be caused by either internal
or external effects and of course the frequency and size
are essential to risk modelling. There are two obvious
questions to ask:
· Why did it occur/happen?
· How can it be controlled/reduced?
Three joint industry projects are itemized. The  rst
allowed a more realistic assessment of blow-outs while
drilling, working over or maintaining wells and during
normal operation22. This used historic data but allowed
the frequency to be moderated to re ect the drilling practice
and the reservoir conditions. The second allowed an
assessment of the failure rate of pipelines and risers23; this
was based on a more speci c researched data set than
used in Reference 9. The third allowed an assessment
of loss of containment frequencies and ignition frequen-
cies24, again based on research of a larger data set. With
these three documents it was possible to assess, with a
degree of uniformity, the frequency of the initial events.
However the value can only be an ‘average’ of experience
and may not re ect local company cultures. The Health
and Safety Executive also initiated a requirement to
record all losses of containment with a number of entry
data points25; this will allow more detailed analyses of
causation/action which in turn should lead to a downward
trend in loss of containment through improved risk
management.
Extensive research has been carried out into the
temperatures in the walls of vessels and pipelines during
the process blowdown. It is self-evident that if the
metallurgy is inadequate, metallurgical failures may take
place either initiating loss of containment or exacerbating
the effects of the loss of containment. Extensive modelling
supportedby veri cation on real installationshas been carried
out by Richardson et al.26,27,28. In one study the predictions
were so accurate that it was possible to demonstrate that sonic
velocities were achieved due to the location of a pipeline
expansion downstream of a blowdown valve.
The response of steel to both  re and explosion events
and the escalation potential has been extensively
researched; the main leaders have been British Gas, Shell
and the Health and Safety Executive. It would be wrong
to think that there was a watershed after Piper Alpha– this
work was being carried out before 1988 but gained
more focus and urgency as a result of the Disaster. It
would not be unreasonable to suggest that the Piper Alpha
Disaster focused attentionon four topics which were speci c
to the offshore industry and somewhat less applicable to the
onshore industry:
· Fires– jets;
· Fires– pools;
· Fires– carbon monoxide (CO) production (most of
the fatalities on Piper Alpha were due to initial CO
poisoning);
· Explosions in modules with turbulence generation
(these are totally different from vapour cloud explosions).
The work can be traced back to the early 1980s when
the needs of the onshore and offshore industries were
similar. Two examples are the research on effects of  re
on equipment initiated by the Health and Safety Executive29
and a set of explosion experiments30 which studied the
effects of ignition energy and turbulence on the  nal
overpressures.
Much of the more recent experimental work was carried
out in two major joint industry projects, the  rst phase in
1990–1991 and the second phase in 1994–1997. It is
likely that there will be a third phase. Some indicators
from this study are to be found in the open literature and
some results are given in References 31(a) and (b). Other
indicators are to be found in Reference 32 where heat
 uxes in jet engulfed structures reached about 250 kWm–2
(a value four times that given in Reference 29). The
properties of jet  ames are discussed by Barker33, Cowley34
describes the effects of jet  ames on structures and
Persaud55 examines some of the effects of large  res in
con ned spaces– the production of carbon monoxide, the
extent of external  aming, visibility due to soot forma-
tion (good visibility with low soot concentrations in the
air is essential for escape and evacuation) and explosion
hazards from unburnt fuel. In contrast Roberts et al.36
describe the bene ts that can be derived from Passive Fire
Protection (PFP). Further results quoted by the Fire and
Blast Interest Group (FABIG) show that real over-
pressures on a test module reached 4 barg. The signi cance
of this can only be judged when the details of the vent
arrangements and local turbulence sources are known;
however, these pressures are likely to result in major
structural damage and displacement of piping and equip-
ment which could in turn lead to escalation of the event. The
results are perforce arti cial and as they are based on
homogeneity and stoichiometric gas compositions, non
homogeneity (a real but dif cult if not impossible test case)
will produce lower overpressures, a 50% reduction in
overpressure for ± 20% concentration variation. Deluge
also mitigated the overpressures– but it has contra-indica-
tions. There are three other less obvious courses of research.
Signi cant research is sponsored by the Health and Safety
Executive and published by HSE Books under Offshore
Technology Projects; one study of note compares the
different models for assessing explosion overpressures
in offshore modules37.
A paper by Crawley et al.38 describes a model for
assessing the effects of layout, equipment and other factors.
This permits the risk ranking of various development
scenarios at Concept Evaluation and the analysis of the
effects of changes on the design which therefore drives
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the project in the safer direction. It could be said that this
leads to inherently safer design. There is as yet no
equivalent tool for onshore chemical plant.
In the end it is necessary to consider the effects of escape
and evacuation. Fùrland39 describes the modelling of:
· The platform;
· Escape means;
· Rescue means;
· The environment.
This allows optimization of the con guration and type
of Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft which
will result in a more successful evacuation of the installa-
tion in an emergency. It is arguable that if an evacuation
was initiated earlier on Piper Alpha the loss of life would
have been signi cantly less.
Manning
There are good safety and economic justi cations for
low manning, none less than the risk from transport from
Aberdeen/East Anglia to the installation. Over the last 10
years there has been a conscious attempt to take people out
of the hazard area by demanning and the use of more
automated control/mechanical handling. Occupation levels
on new platforms are now nearer 75 Persons on Board
(POB), a halving over 10 years, and more use is made of
sub-sea developments or Normally Unoccupied Installa-
tions (NUI). The Eastern Trough Area Project40 is an
example. In the gas  elds there is a steady move to NUI– a
trend set 10 years previously by the Amethyst Development.
Improved Design from Research (Hardware)
As a result of research into explosions it is now possible
to identify areas within the process where high over-
pressure may occur and then to reduce these overpressures
by redesign of the piping/equipment con guration or to
reinforce blast walls so as to prevent escalation.While blast
walls are heavy, by de nition, it is possible to design them
to withstand at least 1 bar overpressure without rupture.
Equally importantly, the reinforcing can now be applied
at the point of highest overpressure without excessive
weight escalation resulting from a global reinforcement
of all structures.
The research on  res– particularly in the semi-con ned
environment of offshore modular design– has resulted in
a better understanding of  re mechanics. Knowledge of the
rate of generation of carbon monoxide and soot has
enhanced the understanding of the Temporary Refuge
impairment mechanism and also the escape potential.
Knowledge of the temperature pro les and heat  ux at
 ame engulfed structures (pool and jet  res) now permits
the identi cation of structurally critical steel members and
an assessment of the correct level of passive  re protection.
Once again this reduces the weight escalation.
While these two topics are clearly ‘mitigation’, the
analysis of the leak data should give some scope for
‘prevention’.
Improved Operation from Research (Software)
The main bene ts from operational research are to be
found in drilling. Modern drill rigs can be operated by two
persons each sitting in their own environmentally-controlled
cabin. Previously there were  ve or six members in a
drilling team, half of them involved in manual handling
of heavy weights with the inherent potential for injury.
Equally important has been the enhanced de nition of
reservoirs and long reach horizontal drilling. It is now
possible to drill a well into the most appropriate location
within a reservoir, so as to enhance productivity (and so
reduce the number of wells drilled). With long reach
horizontal drilling it is possible to have a longer section of
well within the reservoir, once again leading to enhanced
productivity.Taken together, the work has led to a reduction
in the number of wells required for any speci c production
pro le and therefore by de nition the lower risk pro le.
Improved Safety (Platform Architecture)
Modern oil and gas installations have been subject to
risk screening studies (unlike previous generations of
installation) which have allowed the selection of the safer
designs for further development. The Normally Unoccupied
Installations are arguably inherently safer from the process
side but the transfers associated with visiting the installa-
tions cannot be ignored. The more recent developments of
Floating Production Storage Of oading (FPSO) and Central
Processing Facilities (CPF) will have evolved only after
the rejection of almost all other options. This is then further
re ned with the  re and explosion analysis described
earlier.
The new oil and gas production system designs are
demonstrably safer and have incorporated the lessons
learned and research of the last 10 years.
General Trends in Safety Post 1990
The Health and Safety Executive now publishes offshore
accident and incident statistics under the OTO banner. The
style of reporting has changed since the Brown Book2, but
even so some useful indicators can be obtained:
· Helicopter transfers still incur about 2 fatalities per
year. While on the face of it the incident rate appears to
be lower, the sample is too small for the signi cance to be
judged with accuracy.
· The trends in fatalities in drilling, diving, boat and crane
operations continue to show a downward trend: 1/350 wells,
1/500 installations, 1/1000 installation years and 1/300
installation years respectively, no doubt due to the reasons
given previously.
All in all, the indicators of major accident and three-
day lost-time accidents show a downward trend and are
a better indicator of success than fatalities alone.
SUMMARY
The oil and gas industry has moved from a reactive
approach to a proactive approach to safety. The modelling
of the frequency of events, their effects and mitigating
circumstances can be carried out with some accuracy.
However, while the understanding of the causes and their
effects are better, there is still scope for enhancement of
the performance of Safety Management Systems. The
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industry has made signi cant improvements in hardware,
design and protection and in this respect has much to tell
other industries.
The overall trend of the new regime cannot yet be judged
with any con dence; there appears to be a reduction in
fatalities and general improvement in safety standards. The
bene ts of the modern designs are still out-weighed by
older ( rst and second generation) installations, and a
cultural change takes some time to produce its bene ts, so
it may be a few more years before clear trends can be
established with con dence.
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